U.S. Supreme Court in case
and in the matter of Texas Dept. Of Community Aff aires v. Burdine, 1981 , it was noted that the onus of proof of discriminatory behavior is transmitted from the plaintiff to the defendant with the minimum evidence of the obvious case 2 . Th e factual basis of the dispute was that the candidate for a job who was at the same time a member of an ethnic minority in the United States, had qualifi cations for the work, and yet she has not been accepted for the position, and this place remained vacant until it was occupied by a person who was not a member of an ethnic minority. Th is rule of the reversal of the burden of proof was based on the following two premises:
1. Employers are acting rationally, and only they know or can explain the reasons for their decisions 2. Th e most likely reason why the employer refused a qualifi ed member of a minority on the job vacancy is just his belonging to such a minority.
Th e new rule about shift ing the burden of proof under the US Supreme Court decisions should not be a kind of persuasive burden, but rather an obligation to continue in the proceedings. 3 In p roceedings where there is fl oating burden of proof, the burden of proof spills over from the side of the plaintiff to the defendant, and vice versa, and this until confi rmation or a complete refute of the fact, that, for example, the conduct of the employer in the employment dispute has not even contained a motive that could be considered discriminatory. Th us, the court oft en examines whether the grounds put forward by the defendant are not only covering the actual reasons for inappropriate treatment of applicants for a job, or employees themselves, thus the reasons for discriminatory behavior. Th erefore, it is frequently talked about the actual "discriminatory intent. " 4 Th e fi rst allegation of the existence of discrimination, however, is always on the aggrieved or the plaintiff . What is then, the most frequent way used by the employees to prove their discrimination?
Plaintiff s usually rely on a combination of comparative methods (e.g. a black employee was laid off from his job working for a work misconduct, although an employee of the white skin committing the same misconduct was not fi red; or a man looking for work was hired although the female candidate with higher qualifi cations was not; or a younger employee was promoted, though the older one had more experience, etc.) Th e grounds for discriminatory conduct in their mutual combination can be usually presented as follows: ICLR, 2013, Vol. 13, No. 1. a) By proof of fi ctitious reason (e.g., the employer alleges that the employee has committed a violation of the working discipline and therefore had to be dismissed) b) By proof suggesting bias against a certain group of people (e.g. a managing employee used, in public or private, allusions to persons of diff erent race, gender, age, education, ethnicity, skin color, sexual orientation, etc.) c) By proof of discriminatory treatment of other persons (e.g., the employer dismisses at fi rst persons of another ethnicity, or skin color, in the case of his/her diffi cult economic situation) 5 d) By proof of the existence of stereotypes on the part of the employer in assessing applicants for the job or the employee (e.g., the implementer of the status of employees committed insults of women or persons of other ethnicity as people reputed to be less able to carry out certain work) d) By proof of statistical data (in the context of long-term development of case law in the fi eld of discrimination, statistics is oft en a common proof when the complaining party submits offi cial or their own statistical data about existing or ongoing discriminatory practice of the defendant). 
111, ECHR 2002-IV). As a reasonable and objective explanation may not be in their opinion based on insuffi cient mastery of the Czech language, on the diff erent socio-economic situation and on the consent of the parents of these children, State authorities failed to give such
R egulation of the European Union is working with the principle according to which the burden of proof moves only with regard to the facts that the plaintiff cannot have reasonable access to, or it cannot have them reasonably at his disposal. Th erefore, if the complainant submits a fact suggesting that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, the burden of proof must be moved and the defendant must prove that the breach of the principle of equal treatment did not occur. Th e diff erence in treatment as discriminatory behavior is modifi ed also in the meaning of article 14 of the Council of Europe Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 7 , as behavior, which lacks objective and reasonable justifi cation. Th is means such conduct which does not follow the legitimate purpose and for which there is no reasonable relationship between the means used and objectives pursued. States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment 11 Th is way of the proving shall not apply to criminal proceedings, as well as for the proceedings, where inquisitorial principle applies for the courts or for the decisive authorities. States are obliged to comply with the minimum standards for the protection of weaker parties, they may, however, in their legislation, off er even more protection.
12 A part of this enhanced defense of weaker parties to a dispute is also ensuring access to associations, organizations and other legal entities in judicial proceedings. Th ese bodies, as soon as they prove their legitimate interest on compliance with anti-discrimination law, are accepted into the proceedings (or they even initiate the proceedings themselves) and they usually support the complaining party or they provide it with the necessary legal means (legal advice, funds for the process, etc.) to defend their rights against the employer. It is interesting that on the side of the employers are oft en big companies, concerns, and/or entities that are in the case of reimbursement for so called non-material damage -fi nancial satisfaction, also able to meet the cost of these auxiliary bodies. 14 Th is regulation implements a signifi cant part of the anti-discrimination legislation.
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Th e Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in the application for revocation of provisions of section 133 of CCP for its alleged unconstitutionality decided that:
"By the interpretation of the provisions of section 133a (2) Th us, according to the opinion of Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, the shift ing of the burden of proof does not mean a defi nitive "condemnation" of the defendant to lose, but a requirement that the defendant in reasonable and convincing arguments explained the non-discriminatory nature of its decision. "Th e requirement that the complaining party had to prove that the complainant was discriminated against precisely and exclusively for their racial origin (ethnic) and not due to another, is obviously impossible, because to prove motivation (incentive) 
of the defendant is inherently impossible from very the nature of things. "
17 It is not, therefore, a presumption of guilt. Both the Czech and European legislation work with shared, (also known as shift ing or fl oating burden of proof) burden of proof, because the true transfer of the burden of proof would be inequitable in its result. It would subsequently lead non-proportional eff ects on the subject the accused of discrimination. In the dispute over discrimination, therefore, a diff erent principle of evidence than in other private-law disputes applies.
Th e Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic also expressed its opinion on a situation where the ordinary courts had not suffi ciently considered the alleged discriminatory act, and stated that Constitutional Court cannot pronounce generally valid conclusion what behavior is discriminatory, because it always depends on the circumstances of the particular case. However, it is necessary general courts properly addressed the alleged objection of a discriminatory act and did not infringe the constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. If the complainant alleges a discriminatory act and this is be documented in a manner from which the discrimination results prima facie, the application of section 133 (a) of the CPR and thus the reversing of the burden of proof, applies.
18
However, the scope of things, in which the burden of proof passes to the defendant, does not overlap in the whole range with the arrangements contained in the Act. No. 198/2009 Coll., on equal treatment and the legal means of protection against discrimination and on amendments to certain acts (the Anti-discrimination act). Th e Anti-discrimination act prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic origin, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, faith and belief in all the areas defi ned in section 1 (1) of the Anti-discriminatory act. According to the provisions of section 132 (a) however, the burden of proof for may be shift ed from the these reasons (with the exception of nationality) only in the workplace or other dependent activity, profession, business or other self-employed activity, membership in the organizations of employees or employers and professional membership and the activities in the professional chambers, and furthermore, on the basis of ethnic origin, the burden of proof is also transferred in the provision of health and social care, in access to education and training, access to public procurement, access to housing, memberships in interest associations and in the sale of the goods in the shop or the provision of services 19 ; and on the basis of sex, the burden of proof is transferred in the fi eld of access to goods and services.
20
Rules of the administrative procedure with regard to proof of discrimination, are listed in the provisions of section 64 of Act No. 150/2002 Coll., Code of Administrative Justice, as amended (hereinaft er referred to as "CAJ") and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to them mutatis mutandis, that means also provisions of section 133 (a). Th e Act No. 500/2004, the Administrative Procedure Code as amended, however, does not directly contain provisions relating to the transfer of the burden of proof. If the administrative procedure is controlled by the inquisitorial principle, which, as a rule it is, it is the decision of the administrative body which method of investigation it uses. Administration bodies, when investigating the matter, should therefore use the procedure, which is eff ectively the same as a institute of shared burden of proof and which will lead to ascertainment of the factual situation of the matter. However, with knowledge of the facts, it could be doubted that the administrative authorities will follow the above mentioned procedure.
21
On the American continent, where the idea of shift ing the burden of proof emerged, some very critical views have been occurring more and more frequently. Th ese opinions are based on skepticism about whether a person of judges themselves, who decide on merit, are involved in so called subconscious discrimination.
22 Th e so-called cognitive bias that explains discrimination as a natural part of the human psyche, and in which there are stereotypes that have infl uence on decision-making without any intention, can negatively aff ect the decision-making process. I believe that, for example, in the matter of D. H. and others v. the Czech Republic, in which the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court fi nally decided on the existing discriminatory motive in the Czech legislation using the statistics as a decisive argument, such a stereotype about the persistent discrimination against Roma people in the Czech Republic may be considered. Th is conclusion follows also, inter alia, of all the reports of the Commission at the time when the Czech Republic negotiated its accession to the EU.
Overall, it can be concluded that the fi ght against discrimination in the form of shift ing the burden of proof is now an integral part of the legal systems of countries in Europe, but despite this, the very psychology of discrimination is not completely dealt with.
